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Glacier-related hazards are common in high-
mountain regions. Climate change and inten-
siﬁ cation of human activities in mountains 
have attracted increasing interest to the related 
risks, where risk is understood as a function of 
hazard (probability) and damage potential (e.g., 
Fell 1994). The management of these risks is 
a complex task involving analysis, evaluation, 
and communication as well as prevention and 
mitigation (Greminger 2003). In  Switzerland, 
which has a comparatively long tradition of 
dealing with glacial hazards, research has 
focused on assessing these hazards and the 
related risks (Haeberli et al. 1989; Huggel et al. 
2004) and includes risk evaluation approaches 
involving local stakeholders (Wegmann et al. 
2004). In many places in the Swiss mountains, 
the glacial-risk debate  represents an area of ten-
sion or conﬂ ict between different economic or 
political interests. How the risks are perceived 
is therefore often governed by different indi-
vidual perspectives. Taking our experiences in 
 Switzerland as a basis, we have contributed to 
several hazard assessment and management 
studies in other high-mountain regions of the 
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world and have observed signiﬁ cant differences 
in the way glacial hazards and the related risks 
are dealt with.
This article is a physical scientist’s view 
of glacial disasters and the responses of local 
populations and authorities in four high-
mountain areas of the world. Local responses 
to hazards depend on hazard and risk percep-
tion by different actors. Although we cannot 
provide sufﬁ cient material for detailed insight 
into the local perception of hazards, it may be 
useful to refer brieﬂ y to some related issues. 
Risk and the perception of risk constitute a 
ﬁ eld in which physical or engineering sci-
ence meets social science. Although this may 
represent an opportunity to bridge the two 
cultures, it has been an area of controversy 
(Renn 1998). The approaches to risk percep-
tion adopted by technical experts have often 
contrasted with those of social scientists. 
Many social scientists have argued that tech-
nical, probability-based risk assessments over-
look the fact that risk is a social construction 
rather than a representation of real hazards 
(e.g., Jasanoff 1993). Technical risk analyses 
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have furthermore drawn criticism for having 
failed to take sufﬁ cient account of the multi-
tude of socioeconomic consequences that peo-
ple associate with risks (Freudenberg 1989). 
Technical experts, for their part, have argued 
that the priorities of risk management should 
not be governed by the possible mispercep-
tion or ignorance of the public (Sapolsky 
1990). Individuals respond according to their 
own perceptions of risk and not according to 
an objective risk scientiﬁ cally assessed. Risk 
management strategies that are based only 
on technical assessments and do not consider 
individual perceptions are likely to fail. More 
recently, therefore, efforts have been made 
to combine technical risk assessment with 
considerations of risk perception, social ade-
quacy, and fairness (Renn 1998).
In view of the complexity of this highly 
interdisciplinary ﬁ eld, it is clearly beyond the 
scope of this chapter to provide a compre-
hensive study of the technical assessment or 
perception of glacial risks. The primary objec-
tive is rather a comparison of four case stud-
ies with regard to the nature of the hazards, 
the responses to them, and the management 
approaches adopted. The comparative charac-
ter of this study prevents us from providing 
a full account of each case, and the picture 
that emerges may therefore be incomplete 
from the viewpoint of either physical or social 
scientists. It is, however, an attempt to nar-
row the gap between technical and social 
approaches to risk management in mountain 
areas by documenting the problems prevail-
ing in different regions not only in terms of 
physical hazards but also in terms of their 
interaction with local populations and authori-
ties. It is based on hazard assessment studies 
performed in recent years and experience in 
managing these hazards and risks in cooper-
ation with the local, regional and national 
authorities. The cases involved the glacier-clad 
volcanoes of Central Mexico, the glacial lakes 
of the Cordillera Blanca of Peru, the complex 
hazards related to glacier instability in the 
 Italian Alps, and a large ice/rock avalanche 
disaster in the Caucasus.
GLACIER-CLAD VOLCANOES IN 
CENTRAL MEXICO
Mexico’s glaciers are situated on three different 
volcanoes, of which Popocatépetl is currently 
the most active. Glaciers on active volcanoes 
can pose an especially serious hazard to the 
surrounding population when volcanic activ-
ity interacts with ice and generates the melt-
induced volcanic debris ﬂ ows known as lahars 
(Major and Newhall 1989). The terrible catas-
trophe of Nevado del Ruíz, Colombia, in 1985, 
with a death toll of over 20,000, demonstrated 
the destructive potential of glacier-clad volca-
noes (Thouret 1990). In Mexico, Popocatépetl 
returned to an eruptive cycle in 1994 and since 
then has erupted several times, with ashfall 
events occasionally reaching as far as Mexico 
City, 70 km away (Julio Miranda et al. 2005; 
Figure 5.1). Tens of thousands of people live 
around the volcano and could be affected by 
major debris ﬂ ows descending its ﬂ anks. Small 
glaciers are nestled on top of the north-northwest 
side of the volcano. In recent decades, but par-
ticularly since 1994, they have suffered from a 
strong retreat attributed to atmospheric warm-
ing and, more recently, predominantly to volca-
nic activity (Delgado 1997; Huggel and Delgado 
2000; Julio and Delgado 2003). Major lahar 
events, both presumably related to ice melt, 
occurred in 1997 and 2001 (Julio et al. 2005). 
Although these lahars stopped just before they 
reached local settlements, historical records 
indicate that lahars have traveled tens of kilo-
meters  farther, reaching areas that are heavily 
populated today (Siebe et al. 1996).
The activity of Popocatépetl in recent years 
has provoked a number of crises requiring risk 
management: In 1994, 1998, and 2000 there 
were major evacuations of local populations. 
The problems associated with these evacuations 
(opposition by local people) indicated that the dif-
ferent actors involved had divergent perspectives 
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on hazards and risks. Our observations suggested 
that the main actors could be roughly grouped 
into three groups: the scientists, the authorities, 
and the local (indigenous) populations.
The scientists, mostly vulcanologists in this 
case, adopted a technical perspective on the pro-
fessional level, although they may have devel-
oped more intimate personal relationships with 
“their” volcanoes. Hazards were assessed in 
terms of the available information regarding the 
volcano and its glaciers; different scenarios were 
developed and best estimates of uncertainties 
provided. Because risk assessments are based 
on information about hazards and potential 
damage, the scientists’ role was communicating 
their ﬁ ndings to the authorities and providing 
well-considered and intelligible expert informa-
tion to the public via the media.
The authorities were concerned with risk 
management, and their decisions depended 
heavily on the hazard assessments of the sci-
entists. Evacuations of several tens of thou-
sands of people are an enormous challenge 
in terms of logistics. They therefore needed 
the cooperation of residents. Obviously, at 
least partially similar perceptions of the haz-
ards and possible risks would have facilitated 
evacuation efforts. It has long been recognized 
that knowledge plays a  crucial role in risk per-
ception ( Johnson 1993; Okrent 1998), and 
 therefore risk  communication—the transmis-
sion of  knowledge—was an important part 
of the authorities’ risk- prevention efforts (De 
 Marchi 1993). Risk communication has two 
 components— education and warning (Voight 
1996). Information on risks inﬂ uences risk per-
ception and eventually the public response dur-
ing crises (e.g., Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1991). In 
Mexico, an important way of delivering a warn-
ing with regard to volcanic hazards is a three-
level alert signal released by the media. The 
educational component includes elements such 
as simulation, maps of evacuation routes, and 
other  training efforts (De la Cruz-Reyna 1999).
The risk perception of the indigenous and 
other people living around Popocatépetl cannot 
be adequately analyzed here, but our experi-
ence and that of others suggests that the major 
inﬂ uences on it are ethno-religious and poverty-
related. The indigenous people of Central Mexico 
view volcanoes as titans. They call Popocatépetl 
(“Smoking Mountain” in Nahuatl) “Don Goyo” 
and consider it sacred. The often-used diminutive 
“Don Goyito” points to the affection they have for 
it, and the offerings made in an attempt to calm 
it are another expression of this relationship. The 
FIGURE 5.1.  Shaded digital terrain model showing the area around the glacier-clad 
Popocatépetl and Iztaccíhuatl volcanoes, with the two major cities of Mexico and Puebla 
and several towns in the immediate vicinity (courtesy of P. Julio).
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Catholic Church has further inﬂ uenced the peo-
ple by preaching divine control of one’s destiny.
The effect of poverty or lack of resources on 
risk perception is most clearly reﬂ ected in the 
evacuations of the past (Macías 1999). Many 
rural people lack the resources to leave their 
property (Figure 5.2). Further, historical distrust 
of the authorities makes them reluctant to leave 
their domestic animals with people they do not 
know (e.g., military) in the event of evacuation. 
The risk associated with leaving seems to be per-
ceived as greater than the risk associated with 
staying. Social scientists have emphasized that 
the authorities’ imposing their own risk per-
ception upon residents is problematic (Macías 
1999). Differences in the perceived beneﬁ ts 
(e.g., fruitful volcanic soil) and harm associated 
with volcanic risk have often been identiﬁ ed by 
risk perception research (Slovic 1987). Whereas 
local people value staying in the location of their 
vital economic assets more than they fear the 
adverse effects of volcanic activity, the potential 
losses dominate the view of the authorities.
GLACIAL LAKES IN THE 
CORDILLERA BLANCA
The Peruvian Cordillera Blanca has been 
strongly affected by glacial disasters. In fact, 
some of the greatest glacial catastrophes ever 
documented roared down the Santa River valley 
in the  Cordillera Blanca in the twentieth century 
( Figure 5.3). In 1941 the moraine that dammed 
the glacial lake Palcacocha suddenly burst, trig-
gering an outburst ﬂ ood that destroyed about 
one-third of the city of Huaraz more than 20 km 
away and killed some 6,000 people (Reynolds 
1992). Even more destructive were the ice ava-
lanches from Mt. Huascarán Norte in 1962 and 
1970. The 1970 avalanche completely buried the 
settlement of Yungay, and more than 20,000 
people were killed (Plafker and Ericksen 1978). 
The 1941 Palcacocha disaster had alerted the 
Peruvian authorities to the problem, and they 
had established the Comisión de Control de las 
Lagunas de la Cordillera Blanca, which subse-
quently became the División de Glaciología y 
Seguridad de Lagunas and today is the Unidad de 
Glaciología y Recursos Hídricos (Silverio 2003; 
Carey 2005). Mitigation measures such as lake 
level lowering, dam construction, and the cre-
ation of drainage tunnels were undertaken in the 
1970s and 1980s, chieﬂ y ﬁ nanced by the hydro-
power company ElectroPerú and its subsidiary 
in Huaraz, Hidrandina S.A. Mitigation activities 
have decreased in recent years because of a lack 
of resources, political changes, and the privatiza-
tion of ElectroPerú, even though strong glacier 
retreat and the related formation or growth of 
numerous glacial lakes pose persistent hazards 
to the downstream communities. As is typical for 
glacial hazards, the prevailing hazards are char-
acterized by a low probability of occurrence but 
high potential magnitude ( Huggel et al. 2004). 
During glacial hazard studies performed in the 
Cordillera Blanca we observed a number of fac-
tors that played a role in hazard management 
and the response of the local population.
In contrast to the situation in many other 
regions, the memory of historical disasters is 
vivid. This is probably because of their particu-
lar severity and reminders such as the memo-
rial at the place where the town of Yungay was 
buried by the avalanche. However, the oral tra-
dition of the disasters is often not very accurate 
and tends to generate fear.
The poverty of many of the people in the 
 Cordillera Blanca, together with a lack of knowl-
edge about the hazards and limited available 
FIGURE 5.2.  Scientiﬁ c experts preparing for a glaciological 
ﬁ eld campaign in an indigenous village at the toe of the 
glacier-clad volcano Pico de Orizaba, Mexico. (Photo C. Huggel.)
72     s o c i e ta l  p er ce p t ions
land, forces them to settle in places suscep-
tible to hazards—for example, close to or even 
within river channels. This is a common prob-
lem in less developed countries (Alcántara-Ayala 
2002). Further, even if the hazards are known, 
the problems associated with daily survival are 
usually rated higher than the risk of infrequent 
glacial disasters.
The severely limited resources of the  federal 
and regional agencies responsible for hazard 
FIGURE 5.3.  ASTER satellite image showing the Cordillera Blanca, with the Santa River valley, the city of Huaraz, and the 
former town of Yungay (destroyed by the 1970 ice avalanche).
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mitigation and their sometimes limited efﬁ -
ciency make it difﬁ cult to reduce risks signiﬁ -
cantly. Carey (2005) furthermore points out 
that distrust of government and of scientiﬁ c 
experts and past failures of the authorities to 
follow scientists’ warnings have contributed to 
glacial disasters in the Cordillera Blanca. A lack 
of communication and trust has thus increased 
the vulnerability to glacial hazards.
An instructive instance of the role of com-
munication and trust occurred in April 2003, 
when remote-sensing experts from the NASA 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) misinterpreted 
an ASTER satellite image and released a warn-
ing on the JPL Web site about the threat of an 
ice avalanche’s falling into Lake Palcacocha and 
producing an outburst ﬂ ood that could seriously 
affect Huaraz (Steitz and Buis 2003). The report 
was taken up by the Peruvian media and pro-
voked great concern and even panic in  Huaraz. By 
unfortunate coincidence, it was released just 10 
days after an actual accident at Lake  Palcacocha, 
when one of the steep moraine slopes containing 
the lake had failed and generated an impact wave 
in the lake (Figure 5.4). The wave had destroyed 
one of the overﬂ ow dams and produced a small 
ﬂ ood. Huaraz had been affected by an increased 
sediment load in the river, causing severe fresh-
water problems for a week. Thus, people were 
already worried when they received the news of a 
potential disaster. Although government ofﬁ cials 
asserted that there was no danger from Lake 
Palcacocha, radio stations in Huaraz urged resi-
dents to pack their valuables to be prepared for 
a quick getaway (Carey 2005). The population’s 
distrust of government caused some to prefer 
to believe the NASA report. The most serious 
impact of the report was on the tourism industry 
and thus the local and regional economy. People 
from other parts of Peru who had intended to 
visit the Huaraz region for the Easter holidays 
canceled their trips in great numbers. The eco-
nomic damage was estimated to be on the order 
of US$20 million.
Subsequent analysis of the satellite image 
and ﬁ eld studies at Palcacocha by one of 
us (C. Huggel) and others showed that the 
“ crevasse”  identiﬁ ed by NASA was a bedrock 
outcrop exposed by the normal process of gla-
cier thinning. Further investigations of the situ-
ation indicated that the NASA report had been 
a serious misinterpretation. The situation at 
 Palcacocha is not, however, without hazards. 
Spontaneous or earthquake-induced slope fail-
ures of the moraine are a major problem and 
could generate another impact wave in the lake. 
Fortunately, the lake level has been artiﬁ cially 
lowered to its present volume of ca. 3.5 million 
m3 of water. It is possible that an outburst ﬂ ood 
would be attenuated to some degree down-
stream, but in the worst case adverse effects 
on Huaraz could certainly not be excluded. The 
situation therefore needs monitoring, and this is 
currently the task of the Unidad de Glaciología y 
Recursos Hídricos in Huaraz.
On the one hand, this unfortunate incident 
shows the psychological and economic vulner-
ability of this area not only to glacial hazards but 
also to failed risk communication and empha-
sizes the importance of appropriate and respon-
sible risk management. On the other hand, it 
perfectly demonstrates the increasing global-
ization of hazard assessment and related risk 
communication, including the growing possi-
bility of looking from everywhere into anyone’s 
backyard with modern satellite technology and 
thus interfering with governmental activities in 
foreign countries.
FIGURE 5.4.  Lake Palcacocha below the mountain massif 
of Palcaraju (6,274 m a.s.l.), July 2003. The moraine failure 
of March 2003 occurred on the right (arrow). The destroyed 
overﬂ ow dam is marked at the lower left. (Photo C. Huggel.)
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GLACIER INSTABILITY IN MACUGNAGA
Macugnaga is located on the southeastern ﬂ ank 
of Monte Rosa (4,634 m a.s.l.), a major gla-
ciated mountain massif in the Alps and the 
border region between Switzerland and Italy 
(Figure 5.5). Macugnaga has one of the most 
spectacular high-mountain landscapes in the 
Alps: the 2,500-m-high Monte Rosa east face, 
with the Belvedere Glacier at its base descend-
ing to about 1,700 m a.s.l. A moraine- and ice-
dammed glacial lake, Lago delle Locce, adjacent 
to the Belvedere Glacier had an outburst in 
FIGURE 5.5.  Overview of the Belvedere Glacier, October 2001 (courtesy of the Glaciorisk 
Project), showing the initial formation of the supraglacial lake (Lago Efﬁ mero) and 
indicating the lake area by 2002.
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1979 that caused massive damage in the vil-
lage of Macugnaga and led to the initiation of 
 mitigation measures (Haeberli and Epifani 
1986; Dutto and Mortara 1992).
In 2001, an extraordinary surgelike  process 
started at the Belvedere Glacier, with ice ﬂ ow 
velocities increasing by almost one order of 
 magnitude and a glacier surface uplift of up to 
20–30 m. These developments threatened ski 
runs with ice/rock fall and obstructed hiking 
trails and cableway transport facilities ( Figure 5.6 
[Haeberli et al. 2002]). In 2002 a much more 
serious hazard developed: A large supragla-
cial lake formed on the Belvedere Glacier and 
reached a volume of 3 million m3 of water (Tam-
burini et al. 2003), a uniquely large example of 
this phenomenon in the Alps (Kääb et al. 2004). 
A lake with such an enormous quantity of water 
towering above Macugnaga represented a seri-
ous threat to the mountain community. When 
scientists and community authorities observed 
a lake-level rise of 1 m per day by the end of 
June (due to intense melt conditions on the east 
face), the Ministry of Civil Protection in Rome 
was alerted. Within 24 hours a massive admin-
istrative, technical, and logistic organization 
was set in motion. The civil protection authori-
ties assumed control over the military, police, 
and rescue services in accordance with Italian 
law. The charming mountain village of Macug-
naga became an extremely busy disaster zone, 
with several hundred people from civil protec-
tion, the military, and other local, regional, 
and federal services, as well as the national 
and international media, just at the beginning 
of the summer tourism season. The heliport 
installed in Macugnaga became for a time the 
third- largest airport in Italy in terms of air traf-
ﬁ c. The authorities installed pumps to lower the 
lake level (Figure 5.7), established a monitoring 
and alarm system, developed scenarios based on 
the scientists’ assessments, and deﬁ ned alarm 
thresholds accordingly (Kääb et al. 2004).
Our function as scientiﬁ c advisers before, 
during, and after the crisis focused on the 
assessment and communication of the physical 
hazards. In practice, however, risk management 
and economic constraints inevitably interfere 
with scientiﬁ c activities. In Macugnaga as in 
Central Mexico, we found three main groups 
involved in the management of hazards and the 
related risks: the community, the civil protec-
tion ofﬁ cials, and the scientists. These actors 
were characterized by different interests and 
perspectives and therefore different priorities 
in managing the hazards related to the threat-
ening glacial lake.
For the community, a major determinant of its 
attitude toward the risks was its strong dependence 
on tourism. Emergency and preventive measures 
such as the closing of the cable-car facility due to 
the danger of an outburst ﬂ ood were perceived 
as a threat to the local economy. However, driven 
by an interesting mixture of economic necessity 
and innovative ability, the community quickly 
responded to the new  situation: As soon as the 
FIGURE 5.6.  The mayor of Macugnaga and a glaciologist 
at the margin of the Belvedere Glacier (right), July 2002. 
(Photo C. Huggel.)
FIGURE 5.7.  Efforts to lower the level of Lago Efﬁ mero by 
the installation of pumps, August 2002. (Photo C. Huggel.)
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highest risk had decreased, the spectacular gla-
cial lake was exploited as tourist attraction. The 
name given to the lake by the community, “Lago 
Efﬁ mero” (Ephemeral Lake), pretended that this 
was a unique phenomenon and only a temporary 
threat. Important hiking trails across the glacier 
were rapidly relocated, endangered ski runs were 
abandoned and new ones reconstructed, and a 
dam was constructed to prevent rock and ice fall 
from the glacier tongue. Beyond their economy-
driven attitudes and actions, the local people took 
a relatively relaxed approach to the glacial risks, 
perhaps because of their long experience with 
mountain hazards.
The civil protection authorities’ priority was 
primarily avoiding disaster. The management 
of the risk was highly professional and based on 
procedures that considered the scientiﬁ c, techni-
cal, administrative, and communication aspects 
of the situation. Because the crisis attracted the 
mass media, including the regional, national, 
and international press and national television 
with regular broadcasting during the 8 p.m. 
news over several weeks, the authorities had an 
ideal platform for promoting a positive image of 
their service to the nation.
The scientists, ﬁ nally, had a predominantly 
process-based perception of the hazards, striv-
ing to understand the complex processes and 
interactions. They were the most aware of the 
serious hazards from the enormous supragla-
cial Lago Efﬁ mero. Drawing on their experi-
ence and knowledge of glacial lake outbursts, 
they could anticipate the potential effects on 
 Macugnaga—essentially the core task of scien-
tists in such crises.
Although the people of Macugnaga had 
feared a serious loss of tourism due to the 
image of Macugnaga transmitted by the media, 
the massive presence of civil protection and 
 military forces, and the closing of particular 
areas, the year 2003 turned out to be a very good 
year. The presence of Macugnaga in the newspa-
pers and on television for weeks seems to have 
been a perfect marketing campaign for attracting 
an unexpectedly large number of tourists. Inter-
estingly enough, tourists did not think that they 
were exposing themselves to a high risk in Mac-
ugnaga even though by this time the lake had 
formed again. It appears that in their individual 
beneﬁ t-versus-potential-damage evaluations, 
eagerness to see the spectacular location of a 
near-disaster was rated higher than any poten-
tial danger to be encountered there. Information 
dissemination by the authorities through the 
media, with statements such as “Lago Efﬁ mero 
is under control” and “Fear of the lake is over,” 
likely inﬂ uenced the perception of the public.
ICE/ROCK AVALANCHE DISASTER IN THE 
NORTH CAUCASUS
In the evening of September 20, 2002, a large 
ice/rock avalanche took place on the northern 
slope of the Kazbek Massif in North Ossetia, 
the Russian Caucasus (Kotlyakov et al. 2004; 
 Haeberli et al. 2004). It started as a slope failure 
on the north-northeast face of Dzhimarai-khokh 
(4,780 m a.s.l.) below the summit and involved 
massive volumes of rock and ice (from hanging 
glaciers). The slide impacted the Kolka Glacier, 
largely entraining it (Huggel et al. 2005), and an 
ice/rock avalanche with a volume of about 100 
million m3 traveled down the Genaldon Valley 
for 19 km before being stopped at the entrance 
of the Karmadon Gorge (Figure 5.8). A mudﬂ ow 
continued downvalley for another 15 km and 
stopped 4 km short of the town of Gisel. Both 
the avalanche and the mudﬂ ow were devastat-
ing, causing the death of about 140 people and 
destroying important trafﬁ c routes, dwellings, 
and infrastructure. The ice dam that was formed 
by the ice/debris deposits at Karmadon created 
several marginal lakes of up to 5 million m3 of 
water. Potential ﬂ oods from these lakes were an 
imminent threat to the downstream areas after 
the disaster (Kääb et al. 2003).
An event entraining virtually a complete val-
ley glacier had not been documented before and 
therefore had important implications for world-
wide glacial hazard assessment (Huggel et al. 
2005). The erosion of an entire valley glacier 
actually amounts to the unthinkable  becoming 
reality. The disaster also acquired a political 
FIGURE 5.8.  ASTER satellite image, October 6, 2002, showing the track of the September 
2002 avalanche from Dzhimarai-khokh to Karmadon.
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dimension. Whether this event might have been 
predicted provoked intense debate affecting the 
government authorities of North  Ossetia. As 
part of a team assembled by the Swiss Humani-
tarian Aid Unit to help them cope with the disas-
ter and manage the subsequent hazards, we 
participated in determining that the timing of 
the disaster and its dimensions could not have 
been realistically predicted. It was, however, 
apparent that research and monitoring activi-
ties in this area had sharply declined after the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union because of the 
lack of resources. A project in cooperation with 
the authorities of North Ossetia initiated after 
the disaster and funded by the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation therefore estab-
lished a new monitoring and alarm system for 
glacier-related and postdisaster hazards.
Observations made during the studies in 
Kolka/Karmadon indicated that attitudes of 
the local population toward glacial hazards 
had changed in recent decades. The traditional 
 Caucasian villages of the region are situated not, 
as is commonly found elsewhere, in the valley 
bottom but high above the river channel on the 
valley ﬂ ank, even though water has to be brought 
up from the river (Figure 5.9). It appears that 
people have long known about the occurrence of 
destructive processes in the Genaldon Valley. In 
fact, there had been comparable events in 1902 
and probably in 1835. In 2002 the old village of 
Tmenikau remained unaffected by the avalanche. 
In recent years, however, a different settlement 
pattern had developed, with dwellings (often 
vacation homes) being constructed in Saniba 
on the valley bottom by wealthy people from the 
capital, Vladikavkas, who were unfamiliar with 
the mountain environment and lacked the tra-
ditional perspective regarding natural processes. 
These settlements were ﬂ ooded by the water 
dammed by the massive ice/debris avalanche 
deposits (Figure 5.9). That poor people’s settle-
ments remained intact whereas rich people’s 
property was destroyed contrasts with most 
situations in less developed countries, where 
poor people are often most exposed to hazards 
because they lack the resources to settle in safer 
areas or are ignorant of the potential danger.
CONCLUSIONS
Our engagement as physical scientists in glacial 
hazard studies and the management of crises in 
different regions of the world has shown that the 
social, cultural, economic, and historic context is 
a signiﬁ cant determinant of the local response 
to glacial hazards. This ﬁ nding is intuitively rea-
sonable and not a new insight considering the 
results from a body of literature dedicated to the 
perception of hazards. However, the gap between 
what has been recognized by social hazard or 
risk perception studies and what is applied in 
technical natural hazard studies is still consider-
able. We have found that factors such as lack of 
resources and poverty, ethno-religious tradition, 
distrust of the authorities, ignorance of risk, and 
FIGURE 5.9.  A traditional Caucasian village unaffected by the avalanche (left) and modern dwellings two days after 
the avalanche disaster with the beginning of lake formation (right). All of the buildings in the center of the picture 
were drowned when the lake reached its maximum level. (Photo C. Huggel and Department of Natural Resources, 
Republic of North Ossetia.)
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economic dependence on tourism may inﬂ u-
ence the perception of risk in high-mountain 
regions. However, this list of factors may not 
present a complete picture of the conditions 
governing the response of the local population 
and the authorities to glacial hazards. Given 
the scarcity of studies of high-mountain haz-
ards and the response to them, it is difﬁ cult to 
assess how representative these examples may 
be of conditions elsewhere. We emphasize the 
considerable differences in responses to glacial 
hazards among different regions and among the 
main actors involved at each location. We argue 
that, trivial as a consequence but profound as 
an implication in practice, such differences 
are fundamental and need to be recognized by 
experts concerned with hazard and risk man-
agement. Especially for experts unfamiliar with 
the local conditions, these sociocultural features 
can represent a challenge for efﬁ cient hazard 
prevention. Risk communication has been rec-
ognized as a major component in inﬂ uencing 
risk perception and may help to harmonize the 
divergent perceptions of the actors involved to 
improve the response to glacial hazards in terms 
of hazard and risk prevention.
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